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India’s	foreign	policy	in	West	Asia:	Managing	the
three	poles	of	power
Up	until	now	India	has	been	largely	successful	in	balancing	Iran,	Saudi	Arabia	and	Israel.	In	recent
years	economic	collaboration	has	increased	significantly,	as	all	three	powers	have	recognised	the	advantages	of
engaging	with	the	growing	Indian	market.	Although	this	offers	India	a	great	opportunity	to	make	inroads	into	the
region,	Kabir	Taneja	notes	significant	domestic	institutional	reform	will	be	needed	if	New	Delhi	is	to	compete	with
China	in	the	region.
Little	do	most	Indian	citizens	realise	that	West	Asia	(or	the	Middle	East)	has	historically	been	one	of	the	foremost
foreign	policy	challenges	for	New	Delhi.	From	Nehru’s	outreach	towards	the	region	under	the	guise	of	the	Non-
Aligned	Movement	to	supporting	Saddam	Hussein’s	Ba’athist	Iraq	in	the	hope	of	protecting	oil	interests	and
secularism,	India’s	stake	in	the	region	has	remained	high	on	the	back	of	political,	economic	and	demographic
challenges.
Prime	Minister	Narendra	Modi	has	approached	West	Asia	as	an	important	part	of	India’s	foreign	policy.	However,
whether	this	outreach	is	backed	by	a	critical	sense	of	purpose	is	yet	to	be	seen.	Modi,	over	the	past	years,	has
visited	Saudi	Arabia,	Iran	and	most	recently	Israel,	becoming	the	first	Indian	Prime	Minister	ever	to	do	so	since
diplomatic	relations	were	set	up	with	Tel	Aviv	in	1992	(the	capital	of	Israel	has	been	shifted	to	Jerusalem	since).
India’s	interests	in	and	policies	towards	West	Asia	have	historically	been	linear,	despite	the	nature	of	government
in	power.	Demographics	have	been	a	critical	aspect	of	its	policies	towards	the	region,	as	more	than	8	million
Indians	work	and	live	in	the	larger	West	Asia	region.	The	security	of	these	people	is	of	prime	concern	to	New
Delhi,	and	their	well-being	and	success	in	the	region	are	worth	nearly	$50	billion	in	remittances	for	the	Indian
economy	per	annum.	To	attain	this,	and	beyond,	New	Delhi	has	played	different	roles	at	different	times	to
maintain	its	postures	in	the	region,	that	of	protecting	interests	while	maintaining	its	Nehruvian	bent	of	non-
alignment	and	anti-interventionism.
However,	it	is	only	now	in	the	2000s	that	India	has	enough	leverage	to	make	a	strong	case	for	partnerships	with
the	West	Asian	powers.	India	has	largely	balanced	its	approach	to	the	three	poles	of	influence	in	the	region	–
Saudi	Arabia,	Israel,	and	Iran	–	in	a	successful	manner	so	that	none	of	them	has	overtly	criticised	New	Delhi	for
dealing	with	the	others.	The	reasons	behind	this	new-found	zest	–	increased	counter-terrorism	cooperation
between	Riyadh	and	Abu	Dhabi,	joint-partnership	in	oil	and	gas	with	Tehran,	and	defence	development	with
Israel	–	are	mostly	economic.	The	fact	that	India	is	one	of	the	world’s	fastest	growing	economies	has	given	it
leverage	against	the	likes	of	Saudi	Arabia,	which	was	more	than	often	cold	and	ignorant	towards	India’s	voice
against	terrorism,	especially	on	Pakistan,	throughout	the	1990s.
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Image:	PM	Modi	visits	Iran	in	May	2016.	Credit:	Narendra	Modi	CC	BY-SA	2.0
Today,	all	players	in	the	three	poles	of	power	recognise	that	for	their	own	success,	regional	agendas,	and	inter-
regional	rivalries,	the	Indian	market	as	part	of	the	Asian	growth	story	will	be	critical.	For	example,	both	Iran	and
Saudi	know	that	for	oil	and	gas,	it	is	not	the	West	but	countries	like	India,	China,	Japan,	and	South	Korea	that	will
remain	the	premier	markets	for	the	next	two	decades	at	least.	Riyadh	is	now	looking	to	follow	in	the	UAE’s
footsteps	to	develop	an	economy	beyond	oil	and	is	looking	towards	Asia	not	just	for	hydrocarbon	exports	but
investments	via	its	sovereign	funds	as	well	(new	developments	such	as	India’s	first	imports	of	oil	from	the	US
could	push	both	states	to	develop	further	ties	more	aggressively).
Meanwhile,	in	Iran,	India	is	looking	not	just	to	invest	in	its	large	natural	gas	fields,	but	also	develop	the	Chabahar
port,	which	is	expected	to	be	a	bridge	of	trade	between	India,	Iran	and	central	Asia	along	with	Afghanistan,	while
also	envisaged	as	a	counter	to	the	China-owned	Gwadar	port	in	Pakistan.	While	on	the	third	front,	Israel	today
stands	with	New	Delhi	quite	emphatically,	looking	to	bolster	ties	with	the	government	of	Modi	and	his	party,	the
Hindu	nationalist	BJP.	Modi’s	trip	to	Tel	Aviv	and	Jerusalem	was	a	branded	event,	with	Israel	leaving	no	stone
unturned	in	theatrics,	press	and	red	carpet	treatment	for	the	Indians.	This	is	of	course	backed	by	the	fact	that
Israel,	unlike	India’s	other	partners	in	defence	procurement	and	development,	has	much	more	liberal	norms	on
critical	issues	such	as	transfer-of-technology.
While	these	overtures	from	West	Asia	are	perhaps	circumstantial	for	them,	for	New	Delhi	this	offers	a	rare
opportunity	to	use	its	historically	respected	balance	to	make	deep	inroads	in	the	region,	specifically	in	the	fields	of
energy	security,	and	to	push	India’s	anti-terrorism	narrative.	However,	despite	the	reversal	of	interests	between
India	and	West	Asia,	New	Delhi	still	has	limited	capacity	to	play	large-scale	diplomacy	on	foreign	lands,
specifically	with	an	aggressive	China	looking	to	fill	up	vacuums	left	behind	by	receding	Western	power	interests.
India	has	its	work	cut	out	as	well,	as	while	Beijing	has	moved	swiftly,	backed	by	political	and	economic	capacity	to
make	a	space	for	itself	in	the	region	–	large	investments	across	the	board,	and	its	first	permanent	international
military	base	in	Djibouti,	just	off	the	coast	of	Yemen	–	New	Delhi	has	dragged	its	feet.
Tehran	and	New	Delhi	have	been	in	a	tussle	over	the	Farzad	B	gas	field,	where	India	is	expected	to	invest	over
$3	billion,	as	Iran	balked	on	pricing	while	India	struggled	to	move	its	financial	commitments	towards	the	same.
This	tussle	between	India	and	Iran	is	not	an	isolated	incident,	as	successive	governments	have	delayed	projects
largely	due	to	financial	strains,	and	the	former’s	constant	highlighting	of	civilisational	ties	between	the	two	nations
being	the	bedrock	of	the	relationship	is	nothing	more	than	empty	platitudes	for	Tehran	which,	arguably,	sees	the
global	order	in	realist	terms	much	more	than	India.
Even	as	Modi’s	international	outreach	has	been	persistent,	selling	the	India	story	to	a	largely	floundering	global
economic	structure	in	its	current	form	will	result	in	few	long-term	changes.	Structural	changes	are	first	made	at
home,	with	rigid	domestic	bureaucratic	systems	still	standing	in	the	way	of	the	economy	the	prime	minister
envisions,	which	in	turn	is	driving	his	outreach	to	global	politics.	While	on	the	correct	track,	domestic	institutional
reform	will	lead	India	to	develop	into	a	strong	Asian	protagonist,	a	successful	counter	to	China,	and	a	political	and
economic	heavyweight.	To	realise	this	aim	and	set	course,	West	Asia	offers	a	good	opportunity	today	for	India	to
work	on.	However,	delays	in	realising	this	may	find	New	Delhi	staring	as	the	door	shuts	on	one	of	its	greatest
opportunities.
The	LSE	India	Summit	2016	featured	a	panel	on	India	and	West	Asia.	Catch	up	with	the	discussions	and	read	the
recommendations	here.	
This	article	originally	appeared	on	IAPS	dialogue.	It	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the
South	Asia	@	LSE	blog,	nor	of	the	London	School	of	Economics.	Please	read	our	comments	policy	before
posting.
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